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Transatlantic trade agreements and adjudication without 
‘protection of citizens’ and their fundamental rights? 
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann
The Brexit referendum of June 2016 and the persistent 
debt, economic, migration, refugee, rule-of-law crises 
and foreign policy challenges of the European Union 
(EU) entail increasing distrust of citizens in its problem-
solving capacities and democratic legitimacy. The EU’s 
disregard for the ‘protection of citizens’ (Article 3 TEU) 
and of their fundamental rights in the negotiations of 
the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement (CETA) and the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP) illustrates another 
failure to respect the EU’s constitutional mandate. In 
order to restore citizens’ trust in the EU and strengthen 
civil society support for welfare-enhancing trade 
regulation, the EU must keep its promise of concluding 
‘transformative free trade agreements’ (FTA) that 
empower citizens in the collective supply of public 
goods in conformity with EU guarantees of 
fundamental rights, democratic governance, conferral 
of limited powers, subsidiarity, rule of law, and legal, 
democratic and judicial accountability of multilevel 
governance institutions. Judicial rights and remedies 
of citizens – as protected by the EUCFR – are a 
‘republican strength’ of the EU, even if European 
courts impose legal limits on EU foreign policy 
discretion and force EU negotiators to insist on foreign 
policy reforms protecting rights of citizens by annulling 
EU foreign policy measures (for instance, on ‘smart 
sanctions’ against alleged terrorists, private data 
transfers violating Articles 7 and 8 EUCFR). This Policy 
Brief criticizes the EU negotiations of transatlantic 
FTAs for disregarding fundamental rights of citizens 
and provoking civil society opposition, which impedes 
the potential welfare gains of FTAs.  
Transatlantic agreements without rights of citizens? 
EU citizens criticize the EU negotiations of transatlantic 
FTAs for disregarding ‘constitutional principles’ of EU 
law: 
First, EU law requires taking ‘decisions as openly as 
possible and as closely as possible to the citizen’ 
(Articles 1, 10 TEU). But the EU negotiates FTAs in non-
transparent ways far away from citizens. In the EU’s 
Executive Summary 
> The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (EUCFR) is 
an integral part of EU law constituting, limiting, 
regulating and justifying EU powers and their 
exercise, including trade policy powers and EU free 
trade agreements. 
> The EUCFR protects fundamental rights, 
democracy, ‘public reason’, democratic support 
and legitimacy of the EU, the rule of law and other 
public goods also in the trade policy area. 
> The EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and 
Trade Agreement and the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership risk dis-empowering 
citizens, undermining their fundamental rights and 
judicial remedies, and ‘re-fragmenting’ 
international investment law. 
> EU citizens rightly challenge the disregard by EU 
institutions for the Lisbon Treaty’s ‘cosmopolitan 
foreign policy mandate’ for external EU trade and 
investment policies and EU trade agreements. 
> Rather than exercising EU leadership for citizen-
oriented reforms of trade and investment 
agreements, EU institutions emulate power-
oriented foreign trade policies by excluding rights 
of citizens under free trade agreements so as to 
limit their own legal, democratic and judicial 
accountabilities vis-à-vis citizens. 
> The potential welfare gains and ‘geopolitical 
importance’ of transatlantic free trade agreements 
justify civil society struggles against a ‘re-
feudalization’ of EU powers. 
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2014 ‘public consultation’ on transatlantic investment 
rules, the criticism by EU citizens illustrated how 
democratically inclusive treaty negotiations can prompt 
re-negotiations of intergovernmental treaty drafts so as 
to better protect ‘public interests’ (for instance in 
investment adjudication). Even though EU trade policies 
have recently become more transparent, EU citizens 
have reasons to reject the current CETA and TTIP texts 
on legal and democratic grounds. 
 
Second, the Union ‘is founded on respect for human 
rights’ and requires ‘protection of its citizens’ and of 
their rights also in external relations (Articles 2, 3 TEU). 
Yet, in contrast to FTAs among European countries, 
CETA provisions cannot be invoked in the domestic legal 
systems. They do not confer rights on citizens (Article 
30.6 CETA). This undermines the ‘right to an effective 
remedy’ for ‘everyone’ (Article 47 EUCFR) against 
harmful EU market regulations. The EU has failed to 
meet its legal duty (for instance pursuant to Article 52 
EUCFR) to justify how such ‘anti-citizen clauses’ could be 
necessary for ‘protection of citizens’ (Article 3 TEU). As 
‘the Union is founded on the rule of law’, ‘strict 
observance of international law’ and ‘consistency’ of 
internal and external market regulations are prescribed 
also for EU external relations, without conferring EU 
powers to violate international treaties approved by 
parliaments for the benefit of EU citizens (Articles 2, 3, 
21 TEU). Yet, preventing citizens from invoking FTAs in 
domestic courts and offering foreign investors 
arbitration privileges (Articles 8.18, 30.6 CETA) distort 
and undermine citizen-driven rule-of-law based on 
equal access to justice.  
 
Third, the EU principles of constitutional, 
representative, participatory and deliberative 
democracy (Articles 9-12 TEU) protect the right of ‘every 
citizen to participate in the democratic life of the Union’. 
Yet, the fundamental rights of ‘everyone’ protected by 
the EUCFR – such as ‘freedom to conduct a business in 
accordance with Union law’ (Article 16), property rights 
(Article 17), access to justice (Article 47) and to 
‘necessity’ and ‘proportionality’ of restrictions (Article 
52) – are neither mentioned nor protected in 
transatlantic FTAs. 
 
Fourth, EU law requires to ‘ensure consistency’ of 
internal and external market regulations as well as 
among the ‘different areas of external action’ (Article 21 
TEU). The effectiveness of EU common market law was 
due to its citizen-driven, decentralized enforcement. 
Equally, FTAs with other European countries can be 
invoked and enforced by citizens in domestic courts. The 
‘disempowerment’ and discrimination of EU citizens in 
transatlantic relations runs counter to the EU’s promise 
of ‘transformative transatlantic FTAs’ that can limit the 
long-standing market and governance failures in 
transatlantic markets, which gave rise to numerous 
transatlantic disputes over the past decades. 
   
Contrary to claims by some EU trade politicians, the EU 
principles of conferral, subsidiarity and proportionality 
(Article 5 TEU) constitutionally constrain the exercise of 
all EU powers, including trade policy powers. From this 
constitutional perspective, EU citizens rightly criticize 
the disregard by EU institutions for the EU’s 
‘cosmopolitan foreign policy constitution’. Utilitarian 
economic evaluations (for example the promotion of 
general consumer welfare through FTAs) remain 
uncertain. They justify neither EU power politics vis-à-
vis citizens nor violations of EU law such as via 
discriminatory tax exemptions for US investors in 
Ireland. In order to realize the EU treaty mandates of 
‘strict observance of international law’ and of legal, 
democratic and judicial protection of fundamental 
rights of citizens, the EU must insist that FTAs among 
transatlantic democracies – like FTAs among European 
states – protect fundamental rights to hold multilevel 
governance institutions legally, democratically and 
judicially accountable. Just as the EU has adjusted its 
FTAs to constitutional needs of European democracies 
(like the Swiss referendum against joining the EEA 
Agreement), the different constitutional traditions in 
North America may justify adjusting FTAs to different 
constitutional contexts. For instance, the lack of 
constitutional protection of private property in Canada 
may justify international investment protection. 
Transatlantic investor-state arbitration risks 
undermining fundamental rights 
Civil society opposition against transatlantic FTAs rightly 
criticizes interest-group politics as illustrated by legal 
and judicial privileges for foreign investors. The 
universal recognition of ‘inalienable’ human rights by all 
United Nations member states entails that state-
centred conceptions of ‘international law among 
sovereign states’ must be limited by democratic and 
cosmopolitan conceptions of ‘international law among 
peoples’ and citizens insisting on legal obligations of 
multilevel governance institutions to respect, protect 
and fulfil fundamental rights in non-discriminatory 
ways. The more globalization transforms national into 
transnational ‘aggregate public goods’ (like human 
rights, rule of law, monetary, trading, investment, 
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environmental, communications and security systems) 
that no state can protect unilaterally without 
international law and multilateral institutions, the more 
human rights and foreign policy powers entail 
multilevel governance obligations to protect 
corresponding public goods (as specified in Articles 207 
and 208 TFEU for the EU trade and development 
policies). The EU initially presented transatlantic FTAs as 
‘transformative agreements’ aimed at limiting the 
persistent ‘market failures’, ‘governance failures’ and 
numerous transatlantic disputes in the context of the 
‘Transatlantic Partnership’ since the 1990s. The civil 
society opposition against the proposed investment 
rules illustrates why citizens distrust interest-group 
politics disregarding rights and remedies of citizens. 
Three examples illustrate this: 
First, just as the transnational rule of law and market 
integration inside Europe were promoted through 
citizen-driven, decentralized enforcement of common 
market rules and FTAs, so does non-discriminatory 
access of all affected citizens to domestic judicial 
remedies offer more effective enforcement 
mechanisms than transnational investor-state 
arbitration and related ‘negative discrimination’ of 
other citizens, which unnecessarily limit ‘participatory 
democracy’, rule of law and fundamental rights in 
violation of Articles 52, 54 EUCFR. The EU proposal for a 
new ‘investment court system’ envisages a few 
procedural improvements, for instance regarding the 
choice and composition of judges, public procedures, 
appellate review; but they offer no justification of why 
exclusion and ‘negative discrimination’ of EU citizens in 
international investment arbitration can be preferable 
over non-discriminatory access of all citizens and 
investors to domestic and EU courts, which are more 
independent and more constitutionally constrained and 
can offer more impartial and effective remedies. 
 
Second, in Opinions 1/2009 (European Patent Court) 
and 2/2013 (European Convention on Human Rights), 
the EU Court of Justice (CJEU) emphasized the 
constitutional prohibition of unnecessarily limiting the 
EU guarantees of interpreting and protecting 
fundamental rights within the particular structures and 
restraints of EU law. A 2016 opinion by the German 
Association of Judges inferred from this jurisprudence 
as well as from EU and German constitutional law that 
the CETA limitations of the jurisdiction of national and 
EU courts for investor-state disputes are neither 
necessary nor consistent with EU law in view of the 
alternative of more effective and comprehensive legal 
and judicial remedies in European courts. The legal 
admissibility of ‘negative discrimination’ of EU investors 
inside the EU is likewise contested in a pending CJEU 
dispute. 
 
Third, the broad definition of the ‘applicable law’ in 
Article 42 of the World Bank Convention on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
Nationals of other States illustrates that investor-state 
arbitration involves all three dimensions of 
international investment law: national laws, investor-
state contracts, and international law rules applicable in 
the relations among the home and host states involved. 
The EU proposals for new FTA investment rules ‘re-
fragment’ these complex interactions among the 
interdependent ‘three levels of investment regulation’ 
and related adjudication; they risk harming investors 
and the rule of law, for instance if EU investors cannot 
invoke FTA guarantees in domestic courts and 
fundamental rights cannot be invoked in investment 
courts (Article 8.18 CETA). CETA’s new investment court 
system is no model for reforming international law and 
protecting citizens. 
Transatlantic adjudication: in whose name and for the 
protection of whose rights?   
EU trade negotiators claim that – just as Canadian and 
US citizens cannot challenge violations of FTA rules in 
domestic courts – EU institutions should, likewise, not 
be held legally and judicially accountable in domestic 
courts for violating FTAs. Yet EU law does not authorize 
trade negotiators to use FTAs to curtail European 
constitutional law and judicial remedies of citizens in 
order to limit the judicial accountability of EU 
institutions. EU citizens and parliaments must challenge 
‘Westphalian paradigms’ of ‘international law among 
states’ and related ‘intergovernmental power politics’ 
as being inconsistent with the fundamental rights of EU 
citizens as ‘constituent powers’ and ‘democratic 
principals’ of EU governance agents. The constitutional 
limits of EU powers require the EU to protect citizens 
and peoples as democratic ‘agents of justice’ 
responsible for holding multilevel governance 
institutions accountable for ‘strict observance of 
international law’ (Article 3 TEU) and of treaties 
approved by parliaments for protecting international 
public goods for the benefit of citizens. EU and North 
American power politics in transatlantic FTA 
negotiations are a missed opportunity for strategic 
leadership aimed at reforming the ‘disconnected 
UN/World Trade Organization governance’ through 
‘cosmopolitan FTAs’ among transatlantic democracies. 
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Similar to the replacement of GATT by the 1995 WTO 
Agreement, there is a need for limiting the 
intergovernmental WTO power politics by a more 
citizen-oriented world trading system, possibly based 
on a future merger of mega-regional FTAs. 
The universal recognition of human rights also calls for 
replacing the ‘Westphalian paradigm’ of justifying 
international adjudication through the consent of states 
by a ‘democratic paradigm’ of justifying international 
adjudication in the name of citizens and peoples. 
Among democracies, national treatment and impartial 
settlement of transnational economic disputes in 
domestic courts is more in conformity with the 
‘principle of subsidiarity’ (Article 5 TEU) and equal 
remedies of all EU citizens affected by FTA rules than 
judicial privileges for foreign investors. The EUCFR 
requires the EU to ‘place the individual at the heart of 
its activities’ (Preamble). Why do transatlantic FTAs not 
confirm that their primary objective must be to 
strengthen the rights and general consumer welfare of 
all citizens through trade liberalization and regulation of 
related market failures and governance failures that 
have distorted transatlantic trade for decades? Beyond 
the judicial settlement of disputes, (trans)national 
courts have additional legal functions, such as clarifying 
indeterminate treaty provisions, controlling abuses of 
power, and protecting rights of citizens to hold 
multilevel governance institutions accountable through 
constitutional, participatory and deliberative 
democracy, as prescribed in Articles 9-12 TEU. EU 
citizens rightly insist that outsourcing transatlantic 
disputes to ‘private’ or ‘diplomatic justice’ is not a 
legitimate policy option for the EU. Empowering EU 
citizens will not only strengthen the EU capacity of 
concluding FTAs that are then also democratically 
supported by those same citizens. ‘Cosmopolitan FTAs’ 
among democracies also meet the EU’s obligation 
under Article 21 TEU to ‘advance in the wider world’ the 
republican insight underlying European integration that 
multilevel governance of transnational public goods 
requires multilevel legal and judicial protection of equal 
rights of citizens. 
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This Policy Brief emerged from a recent symposium on 
“The TTIP - Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership Issues & Perspectives for International 
Commercial Law?”, held on 15 April 2016 at the College of 
Europe in Bruges. 
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